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To DEFEND TERSE RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOVIET UNION.
By Valery Chalidze (translated by Guy Daniels). New York: Random
House, 1974. Pp. viii, 340. $10.00.
PRAVA CHELOVEKA I SOVETSKII SoIz. (HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
SOVIET UNION) By Valery Chalidze. New York: Khronika Press,
1974. Pp. 304.
To Defend These Rights will interest any reader concerned about the
politics of dissent and the functions of law in the Soviet Union. The
author was an active participant in the trials, demonstrations, petitions,
and illegal publications that flourished in the U.S.S.R. from the autumn
of 1965 until the winter of 1973-1974. In legal matters he is a self-
taught amateur, a physicist with a first-hand working knowledge of the
Soviet legal system and its operation.' His book is thus a cry for justice
in the best tradition of the Russian intelligentsia, rather than a scholarly
analysis of Soviet law, by a dissenter forced into exile. It is part
historical memoir, part analysis of the judicial system, and part strategy
handbook for putting Soviet law on trial. The book is most valuable for
its case studies of the systematic violations of human rights in the Soviet
Union and for its documentary materials. Yet the evidence presented in
the book contradicts the author's thesis that Soviet law can be used to
advance the cause of human rights. Instead, the author shows us, quite
unconsciously, that in the U.S.S.R. justice is best served by the appeals
to public opinion of a courageous intelligentsia, and not by the law.
I.
Russian law traditionally emphasized duties rather than rights. The
Russian word for "right" is pravo, a term primarily meaning "a set of
norms, rules, and regulations established and accepted by the state," and
1. Chalidze, born in Moscow in 1938 and educated as a physicist, only became
involved in the "democratic movement" in November 1970 when he cofounded the
Human Rights Commission with two physicist colleagues, Andrei Sakharov and Andrei
Tverdokhlebov. He did not sign the May 20, 1969, appeal to the United Nations Com-
mission on Human Rights. As the editor of a samizdat journal entitled SOCIAL PROB-
LEMS and the author of unpublished essays on Class Discrimination in Soviet Law and
On the Civil Rights of Man, Chalidze became a central figure from 1970 to 1972 in
attempts to use the law to protect dissenters. In November 1972, while lecturing in the
United States, Chalidze was deprived of his citizenship and refused re-entry into the
Soviet Union. He currently lives in New York, where he edits the CHRONICLE OF
HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE USSR.
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only secondarily "freedoms (svobody) established and accepted by state
law."'  A right meant something permitted by the state, rather than
something claimed by an individual or held to be just by some higher
standard. The great legal codes of 1649 and 1833 were essentially
compilations of governmental edicts, not accumulations of common law
decisions of the courts. In no sense was the state itself subordinate to
the law. The word for "property" (sobstvennost'), which permeates
Western law, only appeared in Russian legal usage in 1782. Until the
great legal reforms of Alexander II in 1864, there were separate courts
for the separate social classes defined by law: landed gentry, townsmen,
clergy, and peasantry.3 Judges were removed at will, trials were secret,
and criminals enjoyed no right to either a lawyer or trial by jury. Only
during the brief parliamentary period of the Duma (1906-1917) was
there anything approaching a working system of justice in Imperial
Russia.
In Imperial Russia the defense of rights was undertaken not by the
law but by an alienated social group known as the intelligentsia, which
based those rights on higher claims of justice and morality and was
influenced by Western legal and political philosophy. Formed in the
late eighteenth century from the educated and well-to-do segment of the
landed gentry, the Russian intelligentsia began by criticizing the state
and ended by rebelling against it in the name of justice. The call for
rights thus came from outside the state through a Westernized elite
which looked to Europe for its standards of legality and justice. The
victories of the intelligentsia were limited-the acquittal of a terrorist for
a known political assassination in 1878, and of a Jew for ritual murder
in 1912-but not unpromising on the eve of the Russian Revolution.
The Soviet Union has inherited this Russian tradition in a manner not
entirely appreciated by Chalidze, who stresses the Communist and
Soviet sources of the law. Yet party and state interests remain the
determinant of legal doctrine, and law is conceived as a weapon in the
class struggle. Recently added is the ideological dimension of Soviet
law, styled by Soviet jurists the "educational role of the law" (vospitat-
eFnaid rol' prava). In a Soviet court the problem is not only to
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but also to expose the
2. 11 SLOVAR' SOVREMENNOGO RUSSKOGO LITERATURNOGO YAZYKA 26 (1961);
OxFoRD RUSSIAN-ENoLISH DICTIONARY 585 (M. Wheeler ed. 1972).
3. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 211 (1963).
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social conditions of crime to the public.4 In this manner, the state has
in part usurped the old function of the intelligentsia by introducing its
own Marxist-Leninist standards of justice into the law. This has not
prevented the post-Khrushchev dissenting intelligentsia from trying to
use Soviet law to serve its own ends.
II.
Khrushchev himself initiated what Chalidze calls the "movement for
human rights" in the Soviet Union.5 His attack on Stalin at the Twen-
tieth Party Congress in 1956 emphasized Stalin's "crimes" against Len-
inist doctrine, party rules, and Soviet legality; his liberalization of the
censorship, which enabled Solzhenitsyn to publish One Day in the Life
of Ivan Denisovich in 1962, encouraged further literary freedom. The
Brezhnev regime from the outset was faced with a legacy of growing
hopes and dissent among the educated strata of Soviet society.
Soviet law provides little opportunity for the exercise of human rights.
For example, a broad definition of "anti-Soviet" behavior in section 70
of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code permits the state to prosecute dissenters
freely, as in the February 1966 trial of two writers who had allowed
their works to be published abroad. Article 70 reads:
Agitation or propaganda carried on for the purpose of subverting or
weakening Soviet power or of committing particular especially danger-
ous crimes aginst the state, or the spreading for the same purpose
of slanderous fabrications that defame the Soviet political and social
system, or the circulation or preparation or keeping, for the same pur-
4. Berman, The Educational Role of Soviet Criminal and Civil Procedure, in
CONTEMPORARY SOVImT LAw; ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN N. HAZARD 1 (D. Barry, W.
Butler & G. Ginsburgs eds. 1974).
5. The literature on dissent in the Soviet Union is enormous. For a guide to the
legal aspects of the movement, see Sharlet, Samizdat as a Source for the Study of Soviet
Law, in 1 SovIET UNION 181 (1974). The documents of the movement, including the
CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EvENTs, are presented best in UNCENSORED RussiA; PROTEST
AND DIsSENT IN Tr SOVIET UNION (P. Reddaway ed. 1972). See also DEAR COMRAD:
PAVEL LrrvINOV AND THE VOICES OF SOVIET CITIZENS IN DIssENT (K. Reve ed. 1969);
IN QUEsr OF JusTIcE (A. Brumberg ed. 1970); G. SANDERS, SAM ,DAT: VoICEs oF THE
SOVIET OPPosrioN (1974). For important trial transcripts, see P. LITVINov, THE DpM-
ONSmrATION ON PusmKN SQuARB (1969); ON TIAL: THE CASE OF SINYAVSEY (TERTz)
AND DANIEL (ARzHAN) (L. Labedz & M. Hayward eds. 1967). On the trials of Ukrain-
ian intellectuals and lawyers, see V. CHORNOvIL, THE CHORNOVIL PAPERS (1968);
FarMENT IN THE UKRAINE (M. Browne ed. 1971). For legal aspects of psychiatric con-
finement, see R. & Z. MEDvEDEV, A QUESTION OF MADNESS (1971). On copyright
problems, see Z. MEDVEDEV, TEN YEARS AFTER IVAN DENISOvicH (1974).
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pose, of literature of such content, shall be punished by deprivation
of freedom for a term of six months to seven years, with or without
additional exile for a term of two to five years, or by exile for a term
of two to five years.,
Nonetheless, the severe sentences handed down to Siniavsky and Daniel,
seven and five years at hard labor respectively, only precipitated more
demonstrations, protest letters, petitions, and trials.
A second weakness of any attempt to establish individual rights in
Soviet law lies in the power of the regime to change the law at will.
Thus, the dissent that followed the Siniavsky-Daniel trial prompted the
R.S.F.S.R. Supreme Soviet to add a new Article 190-1 to the R.S.F.S.R.
Criminal Code in September 1966 entitled "The Dissemination of De-
liberately False Inventions, Discrediting the Soviet Political and Social
System":
The systematic dissemination by word of mouth of deliberate fabrica-
tions discrediting the Soviet political and social system, or the manu-
facture or dissemination in written, printed or other form of works of
the same content, shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a
term not exceeding three years, or by corrective labor for a term not
exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding one hundred rubles. 7
At the time, protest literature was appearing more and more frequently
as samizdat publications: writings of any kind incapable of passing the
censor that were reproduced by carbon copy or photograph and given
widespread distribution among the dissenters. Because the proof of
"anti-Soviet" intent required by Article 70 was eliminated, Article 190-1
provided the regime with a new weapon. When Article 478 of the
R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code (permitting authors to establish copyright even if
their work was first published abroad) proved inconvenient, it was
simply revoked.'
Third, the law itself makes little mention of rights at all. When the
Chronicle of Current Events (Khronika tekushchikh sobitii) made its
appearance as the "official" newsletter of dissent in April 1968, it
carried on its masthead the text of the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights, Article 19, which guarantees to all persons "the right to
6. R.S.F.S.R. 1966 UGoL. KOD. (Criminal Code) art. 70 (reviewer's translation).
Another English translation appears in H. BERMAN, SOVIET CRIMINAL LAW AND PRO-
cEuRE: Tan RSFSR CoDEs 180 (1966).
7. R.S.F.S.R. 1966 UGOL. KOD. (Criminal Code) art. 190-1 (reviewer's transla-
tion).
8. Z. MEDVEDEV, TEN YEARs A=rr IvAN DENISOVICif ix (1974).
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freedom of opinion and expression." In accord with tradition, Russians
have again sought legal sources in the West for their rights. Certainly,
freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association are guaranteed in
Article 125 of the Soviet Constitution, but only if "in the interests of the
working people." References to Article 125 in recent Soviet trials are
rare, and, when evoked, have served only to rally public opinion, and
not to alter judicial decisions.9
Finally, those rights mentioned in Soviet law are often violated by the
authorities. In theory no more than 33 days can elapse between the end
of a preliminary investigation and the start of a court hearing; in fact,
defendants are often held in jail for a year or more.10 Further, authori-
ties frequently ignore the rights of all prisoners and camp inmates to
receive specified numbers of packages, mail, and visitors." The law
may itself permit the most arbitrary kind of prosecution. Articles 58-60
of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code allow a psychiatric examining board to
order "compulsory measures of a medical character," that is, confine-
ment to a mental hospital. Thinking, as one dissenter put it, "turns out
to be a crime. A crime for which he is tried. But if his 'crime' cannot
be squeezed under an article of the law, they call in you-the doctors."' 2
All of this suggests that Soviet law is not a useful weapon for the defense
of human rights, and yet this is precisely what Chalidze proposes.
9. In February 1967, during one of the first trials of dissidents under Article 190-
1, a defendant argued that "Article 125 of the Constitution allows demonstrations to be
held in our country;" a second defendant claimed that the judge had no right to prevent
him from speaking, citing Article 243 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code regarding trial
procedure. Neither argument achieved anything. The only advantage of such tactics,
as one scholar has pointed out, consists in "arousing public opinion under the banner
of constitutionalism," rather than in making legal guarantees effective. See P. LrrvwNov,
supra note 5; Wiener, Socialist Legality on Trial, in IN QUEST OF Jusnlc 49 (A. Brum-
berg ed. 1970). See also Feldbrugge, Law and Political Dissent in the Soviet Union,
in CoNm-OlARY SovIT LAw 55-68 (D. Barry, W. Butler & G. Ginsburgs eds. 1974).
10. A friend of Chalidze was arrested on September 28, 1972, and charged under
Article 70; he was then held for a year without seeing a lawyer, having a visit from
his wife, or getting a court hearing. Finally he was declared mentally ill by a psychi-
atric examining board. 4 A CHROImCLE OF HuMAN RIGHTS iN rm USSR 35-36 (1973).
11. Connor, The Soviet Criminal Correctional System: Change and Stability, 6
LAw AND SocEETY Rnv. 367 (1972). Prisoner rights are guaranteed in a 1961 statute
and in the 1969 Principles of Corrective Labor Legislation in the USSR and the Union
Republics.
12. Letter from Viktor Nekrasov to Andrei Snezhnevsky, March 10, 1975, in 2 SuR-
vEY 177 (1975). Andrei Snezhnevsky is an academician at the Serbsky Institute of
Forensic Psychiatry in Moscow. See also Bukovsky & Glunman, Manual on Psychiatry
for Dissidents, 2 SuRVEY 179-99 (1975). The classic story of the use of Soviet psy-
chiatry for political purposes is R. & Z. MEDVEDEv, A QUESTION OF MADNESS (1971).
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TI1.
The central thesis of Chalidze's book is that "knowledge and under-
standing of the law is the factor that will determine whether the authori-
ties can violate human rights with impunity or whether they must reckon
with the possibility of mass resistance to tyranny."' 3  Yet in his intro-
duction he suggests that ultimately not the law, but public opinion
aroused by the dissenting intelligentsia, will decide the issue. "[Tlhe
most important contribution that can be made to the defense of human
rights in any country is publicity ... - These two arguments
concerning the relative effectiveness of law and public pressure are in
tension throughout the book.
In Chapter I on "The Specifics of Soviet Law" Chalidze illustrates
why publicity is often more effective than the use of the law. He
catalogues the familiar weaknesses of the Soviet judicial system: dis-
crimination against social classes; the primacy of the state over the
individual; the educational-ideological use of the law through the "com-
rades courts" and the volunteer police druzhina. He also describes the
"logic of the end," by which that legal reasoning is correct which
produces the desired result in the eyes of the party or state. Thus,
concerning the 1971 arrest of the writer Andrei Amalrik, "the procura-
tor told the court that Amalrik knew he might be arrested, consequently
he knew his actions were punishable, consequently he knew he was
disseminating palpably false fabrications."' 5 None of this will surprise
the reader. What is interesting is that Chalidze fails to see that many of
the present weaknesses of the Soviet judicial system lies as much in the
Russian tradition as in Communism.
The democratic movement, as we have seen, often attempted to
appeal to the international law for evidence of their rights inside the
Soviet Union. In Chapter II on "The Soviet Union and the Internation-
al Conventions," Chalidze notes that although the U.S.S.R. has ratified
many conventions, including those on human rights, "the problem of
securing the rights guaranteed by those conventions is still unre-
solved." 16 Chalidze optimistically argues that the appeal to outside laws
can some day liberalize the Soviet system. For example, the Soviet
Union signed the International Convention on the Elimination of All
13. V. CHALuZE, To DEFEND THFSE RIGHTS 170 (1974).
14. Id. at vi.
15. Id. at 33.
16. Id. at 43.
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Forms of Racial Discrimination,' 7 which guarantees the civil right of
anyone to leave any country; in the light of recent emigration of Soviet
Jews to Israel, such a convention could have a salutary effect. Nonethe-
less, as Chalidze notes, "Soviet courts have simply refused to consider
such cases." '
Interesting details on the democratic movement in which Chalidze
took part appear in Chapter III, "The Movement for the Defense of
Human Rights in the U.S.S.R." Here Chalidze becomes both historian
and memoirist. He dates the start of the movement from the December
5, 1965, Pushkin Square demonstration, which urged that the imminent
Siniavsky-Daniel trial be public and also urged a general respect for the
law. Still, the trial was held in secret and was only followed by more
demonstrations, arrests, and trials. Chalidze stresses four aspects of the
movement: (1) the publication and distribution of its ideas and writings
through samizdat and the Chronicle; (2) appeals and petitions to
individuals and organizations both inside and outside of the U.S.S.R.;
(3) a careful study of Soviet laws, apparently under the influence of
Professor Esenin-Volpin, son of the famous poet Sergei Esenin; 1' (4)
the public exercise of rights through publication, demonstration, and
association. While Chalidze tells us little new, he gives an interesting
interpretation of the movement as non-political and intended "to propa-
gate legal and ethical views common to all mankind. ' 0  It is also
apparent that Chalidze's legalistic approach of restraint was not popular
among many other dissidents.
Chapters IV and V on "Freedom of Speech, Press, Assembly, and
Association" and "Freedom of Movement" are less useful. We learn, as
we expected, that Article 125 of the Constitution in practice does not
provide the freedoms described, and that freedom of movement is
restricted for all Soviet citizens through the ubiquitous passport and
propiska, or residence permit. Emigration is also extremely difficult,
not only because of the law but also because of the red tape of OVIR,
the Visa and Foreign Registration Section of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs.
The most interesting chapter is Chapter VI, "The Price of Freedom."
Here, and also in the documents appended to the essay, Chalidze cites a
17. G.A. Res. 2106A, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 47-52, U.N. Doe. A/6014
(1969).
18. V. CHLiDzE, supra note 13 at 47.
19. Id. at 56.
20. Id. at 57.
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number of cases of violations of Soviet law in detail. Many, already
familiar to readers of samizdat, are better presented there: trials are
often held in secret, in violation of the law; lawyers, when available to
the defense, rarely even request a trial; neither lawyer nor defendant can
ordinarily see the prosecutor's file, which is usually kept under KGB
guard in an office known as the Spetchast, or special section; isolated
detention without trial is common; defense counsel only participates
after the preliminary investigation is completed; defendants cannot
choose their own lawyer; lawyers need to be cleared before being
allowed to appear in political trials; defense counsel often cannot sub-
poena crucial documents or witnesses. It will also come as no surprise
that Soviet prison conditions are bad, that psychiatric examination can
often substitue for a trial and lead to commitment in a mental hospital,
or that the KGB often violates the law in its searches, confiscations, and
investigations. Much of this will be familiar to Sovietologists, but the
detail is rich with Chalidze's own experiences, including, for example,
the inability of Vladimir Bukovsky to call him as a witness in 1972.21
Chalidze's cases do not support the thesis that knowledge of the law is
a useful political weapon. One example should suffice. On May 16,
1968, the KGB arrested the mathematician Ilya Burmistrovich; he was
charged under Article 190-1 with illegally circulating works by Siniav-
sky and Daniel and held, in violation of the law, for one year in
Lefortovo Prison. At his trial in May 1969, Burmistrovich argued that
he did not understand the charge, citing a law that all indictments must
be explained to the defendant; Judge Lavrova simply refused to explain
the charge on the grounds that such a law was intended for illiterates,
not university professors. Burmistrovich also argued that since Siniav-
sky and Daniel were convicted under Article 70 and not charged with
"deliberate fabrications" under Article 190-1, that he, Burmistrovich,
could not be charged under the latter either; he received no answer from
the judge other than a sentence of three years in a corrective labor
camp.22 Like other cases cited, this one does not suggest the efficacy of
legal cleverness in a Soviet court.
In his concluding chapter Chalidze discusses briefly the prospects for
human rights in the U.S.S.R. His optimism concerning the possibility
21. See id. at 131.
22. Id. at 132. A more detailed body of evidence on Burmistrovich appears in UN-
cm'Nsoam Russia 68-69 (P. Reddaway ed. 1972).
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of testing Soviet legality itself by referring to Soviet law contrasts sharply
with his initial emphasis on the importance of public opinion. This
confusion, as I have suggested, is not accidental, for it reflects the age-
old tradition in Russian history in which the intelligentsia and public
opinion provide a substitute legal conscience not present in the law
itself. The confusion is demonstrated in an interesting way by a mis-
translation in an otherwise good rendering by Guy Daniels; the term
pravovaia kultura, or literally "legal culture," appears as "knowledge
and understanding of the law.' 2 3 Missing in translation is the peculiar
ambivalence created in the Russian by the compounding of "right" and
"culture," which is to combine and confuse legality and articulated
conscience.
IV.
The last half of Chalidze's book is perhaps more valuable than his
essay, for it contains a number of documents that provide firsthand
glimpses of the Soviet legal scene. In his essay Chalidze suggests the
utility of a legal struggle; the documents do not.
First, legal efforts often simply fail to have an effect. In 1970, the
Committee on Human Rights, of which Chalidze was a cofounder, was
threatened with prosecution because it did not register as an association
under a 1932 law on voluntary unions and associations. In a letter of
February 19, 1971, to the Moscow City Procurator, Chalidze argued
that there existed associations of Soviet citizens that were not juridical
persons, citing the example of co-authors who covenant to publish under
Article 482 of the R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code; he also argued that the 1932
law applied only to associations of more than ten members.24 The
prosecutor did not share Chalidze's logic.
Second, Chalidze himself often directed his efforts not at the law but
at public opinion. When the historian Andrei Amalrik was arrested in
October 1970, Chalidze resorted to a public "Appeal to the Intelligent-
sia." In it he wrote that "fostering people's culture is the task of the
intelligentsia. In particular, this means teaching people (and rulers)
not to fear words. ' 25 There is no mention in the letter of rights; instead
Chalidze asks his readers to "intercede for him-some as they can,
others as they dare to."'26
23. V. CHAL=Z, supra note 13, at 170.
24. Id. at 179-85.
25. Id. at 186.
26. Id. at 187.
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Third, Chalidze often went not to the law but to higher political
authorities by personal appeal. A December 7, 1971, letter from
Chalidze to the Supreme Soviet requested that it intercede on behalf of a
group of 24 believers of the Orthodox faith in the town of Naro-
Fominsk; in October 1968 they had requested that the Orthodox church
recognize them as a religious society and had been turned down. The
church in refusing had cited a 1929 law on "religious associations." In
appealing to higher authority rather than the law, of course, Chalidze
was acting well within a long-standing Russian tradition.
Fourth, legal ploys failed as much with the police as with the courts.
Chalidze's correspondence and accounts of the KGB's search of his
apartment in the spring of 1971 are extremely interesting.27 They
present specific details about the procedure preparatory to any prosecu-
tion under Articles 70 and 190-1, and about general police procedure.
Once again, Chalidze asserted his rights by refusing to sign the KGB
report on the search and confiscation of his samizdat files. During his
interrogation at Lefortovo, he refused to answer KGB questions. Chal-
idze was arrested and interrogated again; while abroad in 1972, he was
simply deprived of citizenship.
Finally, the law is easily circumvented by the use of psychiatric
examinations. In his samizdat essay on "The Rights of Persons De-
clared Mentally Ill,"28 Chalidze shows clearly how the use of psychiatric
examination for political purposes often contradicts the rights of patients
set down in the Criminal Code. Examining boards, whose power to
refer a mentally ill person to a hospital is equally well founded in law,
were scarcely affected by this contradiction.
V.
In sum, readers interested in Soviet law and politics will find a wealth
of material in this book more interesting than the essay itself. The bulk
of the cases cited and the documents presented suggest, contrary to
Chalidze himself, that the optimum strategy for human rights in the
Soviet Union is social and political rather than legal: the open letter, the
journal, the demonstration, the letter to higher authorities and the
United Nations. The key to the momentary successes of the movement
was not in "rights" defined in law and tested in court, but in "legal
27. Id. at 209-46.
28. Id. at 247-90.
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culture"--the public assertion of those rights by concerned and coura-
geous individuals like Chalidze. Yet the movement has, for the mo-
ment, failed, and Chalidze has now joined the ranks of other exile
dissidents. In this sense the book is, sadly, more of an epitaph than a
prophecy.
Robert C. Williams*
* Associate Professor of History, Washington University.
Washington University Open Scholarship
